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Abstract 
The familiar adage that “time is money” may not be entirely accurate according to research 
involving hypothetical choice: People’s decisions are less sensitive to temporal expenditures 
and outcomes than monetary ones. We provide a novel examination of whether similar 
patterns of risky choice are found for time and money when choices are consequential (i.e., 
monetary outcomes are obtained and temporal outcomes are experienced) – both for one-shot 
and repeated choices, over gains and losses. On the aggregate, across decision contexts 
(described and experienced), choices are similar for time and money. However, on the level 
of the individual, little relationship between risk preferences for time and money are 
observed. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these findings.  
 
 
Keywords: Risky choice; time delays; decisions-from-experience; incentivization; laboratory 
risk research; loss-gain framing. 
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1. Introduction 
Descriptive theories of decision making, risk taking, and laboratory research on risky 
choice are important components of risk research that aims to inform our understanding of 
how people respond to risk and uncertainty across a variety of situations (e.g., in work, at 
home). Both decision theory and laboratory research make generic assumptions. For example, 
Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1992) posits that 
outcomes on an interval scale are (as if) transformed onto a scale of subjective value; where 
outcomes are usually monetary losses/gains, but in principle can be any scalar quantity. 
Likewise, decision research in the laboratory is assumed to model decisions made outside the 
lab, whereby research participants’ reactions to choices between gambles involving 
hypothetical monetary amounts, or those involving small (actual) monetary stakes, are 
indicative of choices in larger-stakes decisions not only in finance but also in other domains 
(e.g., health, environmental concerns, etc.). Some questionnaire-based research has 
considered whether individuals’ propensity for risk taking generalizes across domains 
(Nicolson et al. 2005; Weber Blais and Betz 2002) . However, little experimental research has 
directly compared people’s propensity to take risks across different types of actually 
experienced outcomes. The current paper is the first (to our knowledge) to address this gap by 
examining individual consistency in risk taking over consequential decisions involving both 
experienced time delays and monetary outcomes for both gains and losses. 
While some important decisions involve financial (i.e., monetary) risk, we suggest that 
risky monetary decisions are rare in comparison to everyday decisions where completion 
times can vary (e.g., take the freeway or the side streets; take the stairs or the elevator; use the 
reliable printer across the department or the close but frequently malfunctioning printer). 
Taken together, risky temporal decisions have considerable impact on what can be 
accomplished. Moreover, many of the behaviors that cause concern to risk managers (e.g., 
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rule violations; Reason 1990) often involve ‘cutting corners’ to save time. Therefore, it is 
important to understand how people take risks involving different amounts of time, and to 
determine whether theories derived from financial risk taking apply to decisions involving 
time. 
1.1 Time is money? 
 The familiar adage that “time is money” suggests that we recognize time as a valuable 
resource or commodity. This contention is supported by research suggesting that how we 
spend our time is a major factor in how we feel (Aaker Rudd and Mogilner 2011; Borgonovi 
2008). Normative economic theory proposes that the value of time should be measured by its 
opportunity costs (Becker 1965; Graham 1981). Specifically, according to Becker (1965), an 
hour of time should typically be equivalent in value to one’s hourly wage. Intuitively this 
makes sense: If we are willing to work for a given amount that should reflect how much we 
value our time. As such, decisions involving temporal or monetary outcomes should be 
treated equivalently.  
 However, it seems that money is often valued greater than time. Chang, Chang, 
Chang, and Chien (2013) reported that participants preferred money saving options over time 
saving options. Okada and Hoch (2004) reported that in risky betting scenarios individuals 
were more willing to risk losing time than money. One explanation for why time and money 
are treated differently is that the value of time is hard to quantify (Okada and Hoch 2004; 
Saini and Monga 2008). As a result, it is hard to assign a precise and consistent monetary 
value to a specific amount of time – a phenomenon termed the infungibility of time by 
Leclerc, Schmitt, and Dube (1995). Time is proposed to be infungible because it cannot be 
saved for future use (Mogilner and Aaker 2009; Gross 1987; Soman 2001) or transferred like 
money can (Zauberman and Lynch 2005). 
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 It has been suggested that the apparent inconsistencies existing between time and 
money do not result from a true inequality, but, rather, from the difficulty of constructing an 
exchange rate for time and money. Support for this explanation comes from studies in which 
priming individuals to think about time in monetary terms (e.g., by reflecting on one’s hourly 
wage) reduces the disparity between choices involving time and money (Chang et al. 2013; 
DeVoe and House 2011; DeVoe and Pfeffer 2007; Saini and Monga 2008; Soman 2001). 
Unfortunately, the majority of research investigating risky choices with temporal outcomes 
has employed hypothetical outcomes1. Given evidence that concrete representations make a 
difference, this restricts one’s ability to apply research beyond the lab (Falk and Heckman 
2009) to decisions where consequences are experienced.  
1.2. Current study and hypotheses. 
The current study is the first (to our knowledge) to make a direct and equitable 
comparison of risky choices for time and money by ensuring that decisions are not biased by a 
lack of incentivization – a critical shortcoming present in previous research. Based on 
research testing the proposition that time is perceived to be infungible (e.g., Leclerc et al. 
1995) we predict that choices over monetary outcomes will differ from those involving time. 
Specifically, decision makers should show less sensitivity to the value of temporal outcomes.  
 
H1: Time and money will be treated differently with there being less sensitivity to the 
magnitude of temporal outcomes. 
 
                                                 
1 In a rare (perhaps unique) study of repeated decisions involving experienced time delays, Munichor, Erev, and 
Lotem (2006) reported similar choice phenomena for decisions involving time (i.e., for delays imposed on the 
participant) to those observed with monetary outcomes in other studies. Notably, their experiments made no 
direct comparison between choice problems with temporal and monetary outcomes, only included losses over 
very small amounts of time (all less than 6 seconds), did not make comparisons between described and 
experiential choice, and set the majority of the options to have equivalent expected values (EVs), limiting the 
number of inferences regarding risk preferences for time and money.  
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Given that priming participants to think about the value of time seems to bring the 
value of time and money closer to equivalency (e.g., Chang et al. 2013; DeVoe and House 
2012; Saini and Monga 2008) we suggest that experience with temporal outcomes should 
make them more salient, and therefore more comparable to monetary outcomes.  
 
H2: Preferences for time and money will become more similar following experience. 
 
2. Methods 
2.1. Participants 
Seventy-nine participants (Mage = 20.63; 67% female)
2 were recruited from a UK 
university human subject pool and received £10.00 plus/minus payment based on their 
choices (see online supplementary materials A1 for the recruitment advertisement). While 
information regarding participants’ level/program of study was not collected, the subject pool 
was open to all members of the university (undergraduate/graduate students and staff) but 
consisted primarily of undergraduate students who constitute 77% of the university’s 
attendees. All choices were incentivized with either money or time delays - actual amounts of 
time that the participant had to wait. The study lasted 75 to 125 minutes depending on 
participant’s choices and decision speed: As described in the online supplementary materials 
A1 the study was advertised as lasting up to 120 minutes though some participants who took 
more time to make their decisions took slightly longer.  
2.2. Task and materials 
                                                 
2 The university’s student body is 54% female and no effort was made to recruit equal numbers of males and 
females as we did not have any a priori predictions regarding gender differences. We note that in the analysis 
reported gender had no effect on choice (all ps > .33), nor did its inclusion change the direction or significance of 
any of the effects reported. This is in line with recent work by Sarin and Wieland (2016) who reported no gender 
differences in decisions involving uncertainty. 
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We employed two-option choice sets (gamble pairs) with each option having two 
probabilistically determined outcomes (see Table 1). Eight choice sets were employed; each 
set having a riskier option (with more outcome variance) and a safer option (with less 
outcome variance). Four of these choice sets consisted of monetary gains (MG) or losses 
(ML), and four delivered outcomes as gains (TG) or loses of time (TL). In each outcome type 
(time or money) and frame (gain or loss), one set had the riskier option as the higher EV 
option, while the safer option had the higher EV in the other set. Notably, our selection of 
gamble pairs was constrained by the demands of the task and our judgment of what duration 
of session was reasonable. We judged that adding more pairs, while informative, would lead 
to participants losing interest in their decisions (e.g., consistent with Ashby and Rakow 2015) 
and possibly opting to quit the study early. 
The time delays in the TG and TL choice sets were equated to the monetary gains and 
losses in the monetary outcome choice sets using an “exchange rate” of £6.19 per hour; 
participants were not aware of this exchange rate. This was the UK minimum wage rate for 
21-year-olds at the time of the study (February 2013), and closely matched the typical pay 
rate for research participation and for employment opportunities available to members of the 
participant pool. Importantly, this is not a “generic” exchange rate appropriate to all settings 
and decision makers. Rather, for our participants – and consistent with Becker (1965) – this 
represents a best estimate of the monetary value of time spent in the psychology lab and the 
opportunity cost of time that could otherwise be devoted to paid work. Therefore, this should 
create (approximate) equivalence in magnitudes for the two types of outcomes.  
To ensure that the delays in the TG and TL choice sets provided a realistic amount of 
stimulation, outcomes were presented as varying delays in which participants watched a video 
of waiting at a red light or sitting in traffic for the duration indicated in Table 1 (each outcome 
was associated with a unique video). Specifically, when participants experienced an 
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immediate delay following one of their experiential choices they were played a first-person 
point-of-view video filmed from the passenger seat of a car looking through the front 
windshield. The videos used showed either a line of cars in the street directly in front (being 
stuck in traffic), or a red light hanging overhead at an intersection (being stuck at a red light; 
see online supplementary materials A2 for a screen shot). The videos were recorded locally 
(and contained no audio), thus the scenes were familiar to participants and provided no 
novelty interest.  
Because how one learns about one’s options varies from situation to situation, we 
examined risk preference in these choice sets for decisions-from-description and decisions-
from-experience (Barron and Erev 2003). Decisions-from-description represent the 
“traditional” (full information) approach to examining risk preference, in which participants 
are informed of the possible outcomes and their probabilities (Weber Shafir and Blais 2004). 
Decisions-from-experience model choices where one can only learn outcomes and their 
probabilities by making choices and observing the outcomes that occur (for review see Rakow 
and Newell 2010). 
 Insert Table 1 
2.3. Procedure 
Upon arrival participants completed a consent form (see online supplementary 
materials A3), which emphasized that the total time of the study and their payment would 
depend on their decisions. Before entering their individual testing booth, participants gave 
their belongings (i.e., cellphone, bag, etc.) to the experimenter because “distractions” could 
mitigate the annoyance of experienced time delays. Participants read instructions informing 
them that they would be choosing between different options consisting of either time delays, 
which would increase or decrease their participation time, or amounts of money, which would 
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be added to or subtracted from their £10.00 participation payment (see online supplementary 
materials A4).  
Participants were told that they would start out with a two-and-a-half-minute delay (an 
opening delay balance) which, together with any other delay amounts they accumulated in the 
experiment (detailed below), would be experienced at the end of the study. To ensure that 
participants had a current/realistic perception of what a specified time delay felt like they 
experienced a 30-second delay (watched a loading icon for 30 seconds) which was subtracted 
from their delay balance. Participants then made one-shot described choices for each choice 
set and did so again following all of the experiential decisions (choice sets were presented in 
random order); the initial and final described choices, respectively. No immediate feedback 
was given in either instance, though outcomes were added/subtracted from the participant’s 
earnings or delay balance. 
Participants then made 30 repeated choices in each choice set (presented in random 
order for each participant) and received immediate outcome feedback (i.e., watched a video 
which delayed the continuation of the study, or saw the amount of money they had gained/ 
lost) following each choice. We instructed participants in the time outcome choice sets that 
they should imagine that they were choosing between different routes to take to the 
university. Just like the monetary choice sets, participants were told that different options 
contained different outcomes that had different probabilities of occurrence and they would 
have to select the options in order to know what outcomes were possible and their frequency 
(probability) of occurrence (see online supplementary materials A5–A7).  
For the time gain (TG) choice sets participants were informed that a 30-minute delay, 
representing 30 route choice decisions with 1-minute delay each, had been applied to that part 
of the study. They were told that they could gain some of this time back by making choices 
for routes which were less than a minute each, which they would experience as a shorter 
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delay: The delay in these choices was equivalent to one minute minus the outcome of their 
choice. Following their 30 choices, participants were asked which route they would choose if 
they had to take the same route five times. This question was included to examine whether a 
stated preference (“policy”) following from experience would be strongly predicted by 
previous choices. The outcomes of this policy choice were not experienced immediately, but 
were incremented to the participant’s delay or money balance (see online supplementary 
materials A8–A10). Once all choices were made, participants experienced the time delay 
accumulated from their described and final policy choices for time, during which they 
watched a loading icon rotate on the computer screen. Participants were not informed of how 
long the delay would be; it was over 20 minutes in several cases. Participants then received 
their accumulated monetary payout and were thanked for participating. 
3. Results 
3.1 Described choices 
We first examined the described choices (see Table 2) using a logistic regression 
predicting choice (coded 0 for safer, 1 for riskier) by frame (gain coded 0, loss coded 1), 
option EV (coded 0 if the riskier option had a lower EV than the safer option, coded 1 if the 
riskier option had a higher EV than the safer option), type of outcome (monetary coded 0, 
time coded 1), order (initial choice coded 0, final choice coded 1)3, as well as all their 
interactions. In all analyses that follow we cluster on the level of subject to correct for 
repeated measurement (Moulton 1990; Rogers 1993). Table 3 reports this regression4. 
                                                 
3 We coded initial choices as 0 and final choices as 1 to reflect their temporal position in the task. 
4 A backward stepwise logistic regression returned a best fitting model containing which option had a higher EV, 
order, and their interaction (effects consistent with the full model reported above) as well as multiple interactions 
without their corresponding main effects. A forward stepwise logistic regression returned a best fitting model 
containing only which option had a higher EV as well as its interactions with frame (an increase in choices for 
the riskier option when it was better and involved losses) and outcome type (a decrease in choices for the riskier 
option when it was better and involved time). Including which type of outcome (time or money) was 
encountered first showed no significant effect. 
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The main effect of order was significant: The riskier option was chosen less often in 
the final choices (42%) than the initial choices (45%). The interaction between option EV and 
order was also significant, with more choices being made for riskier options that were of 
higher EV in the final choices. No other effects or interactions reached significance. Thus, 
with respect to the comparison between time and money: no robust differences in risk 
preferences were observed (counter to H1); nor did the similarity of these risk preferences 
increase following experience (counter to H2). 
Insert Table 2 and Table 3 
Risk preference in experiential choices  
We regressed option picked (coded 0 for safer, 1 for riskier) on option EV, outcome 
type, frame, and choice number (coded as above), as well as their interactions (choice number 
centered; see Table 4). We find that the likelihood of choosing the riskier option was greater 
for choices involving time (47%) rather than money (46%). As one would expect, we find the 
likelihood of picking the riskier option was greater when it was the higher EV option (57%) 
than when it was not (36%). Choice number was found to be a significant negative predictor 
indicating that the likelihood of choosing the riskier option decreased with experience (see 
Figure 1). However, this was qualified by a significant interaction between choice number 
and option EV, with selection of the riskier option increasing over choices when it had a 
higher EV (see Figure 1). None of the other effects or interactions reached significance5. 
Thus, comparing time and money we find no robust differences nor did experience have any 
significant effect on the convergence of preferences for temporal and monetary outcomes 
counter to our predictions (H1 and H2). 
                                                 
5 Both backward and forward stepwise logistic regressions found that the best fitting model contained choice 
number, which option had a higher EV, and their interaction (all effects consistent with those of the full model 
reported above). What type of outcome was encountered first (money or time) was not a significant predictor, 
though it did decrease the main effect of outcome type to non-significance (p = .056). This suggests that order 
likely had some (mediating) impact on participant’s behavior. 
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Insert Figure 1 & Table 4 
 To examine whether individuals had similar risk preferences across outcome types and 
frames we collapsed across choices within frame and outcome type creating a variable 
indicating a participant’s average rate of selecting the riskier option. Correlating these 
averaged rates of selecting the riskier option with one another (separately) we find only the 
relationship between choices involving (different frames for) time to be significant (r = .56, p 
< .001), all other rs < .17, ps > .14 (see Figure 2)6. Notably, this correlation (r = .56) differs 
significantly from all other correlations, all ps < .005. Thus, for experiential choice, risk 
preferences over temporal outcomes show greater consistency across frames than do 
monetary outcomes, and risk preferences within an individual are not significantly correlated 
across outcomes involving time and money. In other words, while choices involving monetary 
and temporal outcomes are similar on the aggregate (group) level, they are not similar at the 
level of the individual7. 
Insert Figure 2 
3.2. Policy Choice  
We examined whether policy choices made after experience (see Table 2) differed 
from the 30th experience-based choice, and whether such choices were influenced by outcome 
type. To do so, we regressed the option picked (coded 1 for riskier, 0 for safer) on choice (30th 
choice coded as 0, policy choice coded as 1), and (as above) by option EV, outcome type, 
frame, and their interactions. The analyses revealed a high degree of consistency between the 
                                                 
6 Examining the same correlations but separately for the first and last (30th) experiential choices only the last 
choices for gains and losses of time were significantly related (r = .26, p = .02). 
7 In addition to the similarity in risk preference between time and money reported here, we also find that these 
preferences develop over time in similar ways for time and for money, being affected by rewards and 
punishments in similar ways. Thus in decisions-from-experience, in which people must learn which option they 
prefer (because they do not initially know the details of each option) it seems similar learning processes underlie 
decisions about time and money. Details of the analysis of switching behavior (i.e., alternations between options 
on successive choices) that suggest this to be the case are reported in the Online Supplementary Materials. 
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30th experience-based choice and the policy choice (78% selecting the same option for both). 
There were no significant effects or interactions involving choice, all ps > .10 (see Table 5). 
Insert Table 5 
4. Discussion 
In line with normative economic theory (Becker 1965), we find that choices involving 
time or money are fairly similar to each other in both experiential and described choices, and 
for both losses and gains on the aggregate (group) level. For the initial set of described 
choices, we also see evidence of risk seeking over losses and risk aversion over gains as 
predicted by prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1992). 
To provide a clearer test of the equivalence of risk preferences for time and money in the final 
block of 10 choices, we conducted a Bayesian t-test (Rouder et al. 2009) of the mean 
difference in the number of risky choices between time and money separately for each of the 
four choice sets. Testing the null hypothesis of no mean difference against a unit normal prior 
for the alternate hypothesis yielded Bayes Factors (BF) varying from 4.0 to 8.1 in favor of the 
null hypothesis (range of BFs: 5.1 to 10.2 with a Jeffrey-Zellner-Siow prior). Notably, BFs of 
this size are conventionally taken as “substantial” evidence for the null hypothesis. Thus, with 
respect to our first hypothesis, we do not find any robust differences between choices 
involving money and time on the group level. And, counter to our second hypothesis, we do 
not find a direct effect of experience on increasing the similarity of choices involving time 
and money.  
4.1. Theoretical implications  
At first blush, our findings appear at odds with theories that posit fundamental 
differences between time and money. Indeed, our findings highlight that the conclusions often 
drawn from previous research – that people on average show less sensitivity to temporal 
outcomes than to monetary ones, or that they value money more than time – cannot be 
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sustained as general conclusions. Our results suggest that when the outcomes of monetary and 
temporal choices are fully incentivized aggregate patterns of choice across outcome types are 
similar. This supports current theory, suggesting that the (perceived) infungibility of time as a 
possible cause for some of the disparities between temporal and monetary choices (Leclerc et 
al. 1995). For instance, the finding that priming individuals to think of time like money 
attenuates disparities in how time and money are treated (Chang et al. 2013; DeVoe and 
House 2012; Saini and Monga 2008; Soman 2001) is in line with our current findings 
indicating that when participants experience time delays aggregate choices are similar for 
time and money. Note, however, that we gave no specific instruction to our participants to 
think about time in monetary terms. Rather, we posit that the concrete experience of delays 
was sufficient to make the average participant treat time like money. Also, our participants 
were aware that they were being paid for their time and also made similar choices involving 
monetary outcomes. This might have resulted in thinking about time as money, which may 
have contributed to the observed similarity between the two commodities. 
Even though we readily speak of “gaining time” and “losing time” – one finding from 
the current investigation suggests that time is less susceptible to loss-gain framing than 
money. This places a boundary condition on the general conclusion that time is like money in 
consequential decisions. Specifically, in experiential choice, there was a strong relationship 
between the degree of risk aversion shown for losses and that shown for gains for temporal 
outcomes, which was not present for money. One possibility is that when time is made 
concrete via experience then the outcome is the outcome no matter how it is labeled, with all 
delays perceived as losses (be they longer or shorter than expected). This speaks to the non-
transferable nature of time (Leclerc et al. 1995): Experienced delays are “spent”, whereas 
monetary outcomes are incremented to a balance for future expenditure (or recovery from 
losses). This is an important set of findings, not least because it supports the assertion of some 
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decision analysts (Razo and Gao 2013) that cost-benefit analyses must necessarily value 
completion times (e.g., journey times) as losses of varying degrees, not as mixtures of losses 
and gains relative to some reference point. 
4.2. Methodological and pragmatic implications  
The monetary gamble has been described as the “fruit fly” of decision research. It 
serves as a convenient laboratory model for a host of everyday decisions. Part of its efficacy 
as a model rests on the critical assumption that money is a valid substitute for other 
commodities and quantities – such as fame, happiness, and security – that are not readily 
manipulated/delivered in the lab. The current studies put this assumption to the test, and found 
a high degree of similarity between choices for money and time on the aggregate (group) 
level. Specifically, we find descriptive choices were reasonably similar within a participant 
for outcomes involving time and money8, and fairly stable on the aggregate level across 
outcome types in experiential choice. Therefore, one important contribution of our 
investigation is to confirm that, in the laboratory, money can, on the aggregate level substitute 
for at least one other valuable and ubiquitous quantity – time. This provides some validation 
for a standard assumption underlying decision research (Ben-Elia et al. 2008, 2013). Thus, 
under these conditions, one could use time-delays as proxies for monetary losses, should that 
be more conducive to one’s research budget or participant payment procedures. 
 However, within an individual, risk preferences for time and money were not related 
across experiential choices – in line with previous results indicating that risk preferences are 
domain specific (Bromiley and Curley 1992).9 As such, it is important to note that one cannot 
                                                 
8 At the level of the individual participant, we find that the consistency of choices for time and money with 
equivalent payoff distributions (e.g., MGB and TGB) approaches the test-retest consistency of choices over 
identical payoffs and outcome types: In initial and final described choices participants selected identical options 
for 60% of monetary and 64% of temporal choices; whereas the same option was chosen in equivalent temporal 
and monetary choices 57% of the time in initial and 60% of the time in final described choices.  
9 One might not be surprised that, in the absence of full information, experiencing sampling variability in 
outcomes makes it difficult to form stable risk preferences (because it is uncertain what risk one is facing). 
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guarantee a reliable assessment of an individual’s risk preference for time based on their 
preferences for money, or vice-versa. This dissociation between group and individual-level 
consistency across temporal/financial risk preferences could imply that our time-money 
“exchange rate” (£6.19 per hour) was appropriate on average, but that individual differences 
in personal exchange rates meant that some participants had higher (or lower) values for the 
temporal outcomes relative to the monetary ones. The implication is that if one is interested in 
temporal/monetary preferences on the individual level, one should first precisely determine 
the financial value of each individual’s opportunity costs for time. Note also that individual 
risk preferences did not correlate significantly between the loss and gain frames for 
experiential monetary choices. Thus our data caution that – even when incentivized – an 
individual’s financial risk attitudes elicited in the gain domain may not be a reliable guide to 
their risk preferences in the loss domain. Highlighting the value of considering both domains 
when eliciting risk preferences (Holt and Laury 2002; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky 
and Kahneman 1992).     
4.3. Limitations 
 While our study is, to our knowledge, the first to provide an incentivized test of the 
equivalency of time and money in risky choices, in both descriptive and experiential formats, 
and for both gains and losses, there are some limitations that should be noted. First, our 
participants were drawn from a convenience sample consisting primarily of undergraduate 
students. As such the generalizability of our results to other populations is open to question 
(Peterson 2001). Second, our option pairs varied only in their outcomes and thus did not allow 
us to test for varying degrees of risk sensitivity. While our decision to use a small subset of 
possible outcome-probability mixes is justified given findings that attention to tasks reduces 
                                                                                                                                                        
However, this feature of decisions-from-experience would predict a similar lack of concordance between losses 
and gains – which was not the case for temporal outcomes. 
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rapidly over time (Ashby and Rakow 2015) future studies should include varied levels of 
outcomes and probabilities (cf. Holt and Laury 2002). Such investigations will provide a more 
holistic understanding of risky choices involving time and money. In a similar vein, our 
option pairs contained relatively small payouts and our participants’ behavior suggests that 
they were relatively strong risk-seekers (e.g., 34% of participants selected lower EV risky 
options in the gain frame). Given that previous research has shown that increasing the value 
of outcomes increases risk aversion (Holt and Laury 2002) it will be important to see if the 
results are robust to situations involving larger monetary outcomes and greater time delays. 
Specifically, one might predict that as outcomes increase so will risk-aversion, with decision 
makers preferring safer options even in the loss domain (i.e., a reduction in the reflection 
effect). It is also possible that when outcomes are large greater differences between outcomes 
involving time and money might be observed.  
4.4. Conclusions  
The current investigation provides a novel and thorough analysis of the equivalency of 
fully incentivized risky choices made for time and money in decisions-from-feedback and 
decisions-from-description. When aggregated across individuals (i.e., the group level), 
choices were highly similar for both types of outcomes in both described and experience-
based choices. Thus time is like money for consequential choices when decisions are 
aggregated across individuals. This provides a set of conditions under which temporal and 
monetary outcomes can be used interchangeably in laboratory experiments when estimating 
group behavior. However, time is not like money in every respect: Individual preferences are 
not stable across the domains of time and money for experience-based decisions. This finding 
is inconsistent with normative economic theory (Becker 1965) which posits similar 
preferences within an individual because time and money have a direct “exchange rate”. 
Consequently, we are on shaky ground should we regard time and money as inter-changeable 
WHEN TIME IS (NOT) MONEY  18 
    
 
quantities when modeling an individual’s risk preferences. In sum, the current study provides 
much need clarification as to when time is, and is not, money, stressing the importance of 
examining incentivized non-monetary outcomes in risk research. 
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Table 1. Choice sets employed. Outcomes (O1 - O4) and probabilities (P1 - P4) making up 
each of the choice sets as well as their respective expected values (EVs): gambles were for 
monetary (M) or temporal (T) outcomes; were framed as gains (G) or losses (L); and choice 
sets varied as to whether the riskier option was better (B) or worse (W) than the less risky 
option.  
Choice Set  Riskier Option Safer Option 
Type Frame 
EV-dominance 
(Riskier is …) 
O1 P1 O2 P2 EV O3 P3 O4 P4 EV 
Money Gain Better MGB £0.10 70% £0.00 30% £0.07 £0.05 70% £0.04 30% £0.047 
Money Gain Worse MGW £0.10 30% £0.00 70% £0.03 £0.05 30% £0.04 70% £0.043 
Money Loss Better MLB -£0.10 30% £0.00 70% -£0.03 -£0.05 30% -£0.04 70% -£0.043 
Money Loss Worse MLW -£0.10 70% £0.00 30% -£0.07 -£0.05 70% -£0.04 30% -£0.047 
Time Gain* Better TGB 60 sec 70% 2 sec 30% 42.6 sec 31 sec 30% 25 sec 70% 29.2 sec 
Time Gain* Worse TGW 60 sec 30% 2 sec 70% 19.4 sec 31 sec 30% 25 sec 70% 26.8 sec 
Time Loss* Better TLB -60 sec 30% -2 sec 70% -19.4 sec -31 sec 30% -25 sec 70% -26.8 sec 
Time Loss* Worse TLW -60 sec 70% -2 sec 30% -42.6 sec -31 sec 30% -25 sec 70% -29.2 sec 
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Table 2. Described and policy choices. Proportion of choices for the riskier option over choice 
set for initial described choices, policy choices after experience (subsequent to the 30th 
experience-based choice in each choice set), and final described choices; robust standard 
errors in brackets. 
Choice Set Mode and Type of Choice 
Frame EV-dominance 
(Riskier is …) 
Initial described choice Policy choice  Final described choice 
For money For time For money For time For money For time 
Gain Better  .47 (.06) .35 (.05) .63 (.05) .54 (.06) .57 (.06) .46 (.05) 
Gain Worse  .34 (.05) .42 (.06) .19 (.04) .24 (.05) .20 (.05) .42 (.06) 
Loss Better  .69 (.05) .53 (.06) .62 (.05) .54 (.06) .68 (.05) .54 (.06) 
Loss Worse  .41 (.06) .35 (.05) .29 (.05) .19 (.04) .23 (.05) .28 (.05) 
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Table 3. Logistic regression examining predictors of picking the riskier option in descriptive 
choices. Odd Ratio (OR) and 95% confidence interval (CI95%). 
Predictor OR z p 95%CI 
Frame (Gain vs. Loss) 1.31 .80 .43 [.67, 2.55] 
     
Riskier Option Better 1.69 1.72 .09 [.93, 3.10] 
     
Frame * Riskier Option Better 1.98 1.40 .16 [.76, 5.19] 
Outcome Type (Monetary vs. Time) 1.38 1.02 .31 [.74, 2.56] 
Frame * Outcome Type .58 -1.13 .26 [.23, 1.48] 
Riskier Option Better * Outcome Type .45 -1.70 .09 [.18, 1.13] 
Frame * Riskier Option Better * Outcome Type 1.36 .44 .66 [.34, 5.47] 
Initial vs. Final .49 -2.12 .03 [.25, .95] 
Frame * Initial vs. Final .89 -.25 .8 [.34, 2.29] 
Riskier Option Better * Initial vs. Final 3.07 2.53 .01 [1.29, 7.32] 
Frame * Riskier Option Better * Initial vs. Final .71 -.51 .61 [.19, 2.69] 
Outcome Type * Initial vs. Final 2.04 1.52 .13 [.81, 5.16] 
Frame * Outcome Type * Initial vs. Final .79 -.31 .75 [.19, 3.37] 
Riskier Option Better * Outcome Type * Initial vs. Final .49 -1.09 .28 [.14, 1.75] 
Frame * Riskier Option Better * Outcome Type * Initial vs. Final 1.39 .33 .74 [.19, 9.69] 
Constant .52 -2.75 .01 [.33, .83] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Logistic regression examining predictors of picking the riskier option in experiential 
choices. Odd Ratio (OR) and 95% confidence interval (CI95%). 
Predictor OR z p CI95% 
Frame (Gain vs. Loss) 1.08 .51 .61 [.80, 1.45] 
     
Riskier Option Better 2.65 6.49 .00 [1.97, 3.55] 
     
Frame * Riskier Option Better 1.17 .78 .44 [.79, 1.72] 
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Outcome Type (Monetary vs. Time) 1.37 1.95 .05 [.99, .88] 
     
Frame * Outcome Type .63 -1.91 .06 [.39, 1.01] 
Riskier Option Better * Outcome Type .83 -.92 .36 [.56, 1.23] 
      
Frame * Riskier Option Better * Outcome Type 1.24 .70 .48 [.68, 2.23] 
Choice Number .96 -5.20 .00 [.94,.97] 
      
Frame * Choice Number 1.00 .37 .71 [.98, 1.02] 
      
Riskier Option Better * Choice Number 1.06 4.48 .00 [1.03, 1.08] 
Outcome Type * Choice Number 1.01 .50 .62 [.98, 1.03] 
Frame * Riskier Option Better * Choice Number .99 -.82 .41 [.96, 1.02] 
Frame * Outcome Type * Choice Number .99 -.04 .97 [.97, 1.03] 
      
Riskier Option Better * Outcome Type * Choice Number .99 -.98 .33 [.96, 1.01] 
      
Frame * Riskier Option Better * Outcome Type * Choice Number .99 -.04 .97 [.96, 1.04] 
      
Constant .45 -7.60 .00 [.37,.55] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Logistic regression examining predictors of picking the riskier option in final and 
policy choices. Odd Ratio (OR) and 95% confidence interval (CI95%). 
Predictor OR z p CI95% 
Frame (Gain vs. Loss) 1.14 0.39 .69 [.58, 2.24] 
 
      
Riskier Option Better 4.18 4.24 .00 [2.16, 8.09]  
      
Frame * Riskier Option Better 1.14 0.29 .77 [.47, 2.78] 
     
Outcome Type (Monetary vs. Time) 1 -0.00 1 [.47, 2.11] 
Frame * Outcome Type .59 -0.92 .36 [.19, 1.79] 
      
Riskier Option Better * Outcome Type 1.30 0.56 .58 [.51, 3.31] 
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Frame * Riskier Option Better * Outcome Type .99 -0.01 .99 [.25, 3.97] 
 
Final Choice vs. Policy Choice .74 -0.81 .42 [.36, 1.53] 
Frame * Final Choice vs. Policy Choice 1.53 0.95 .34 [.63, 3.71] 
Riskier Option Better * Final Choice vs. Policy Choice 1.76 1.54 .12 [.86, 3.62] 
Outcome Type * Final Choice vs. Policy Choice 1.35 0.59 .55 [.50, 3.64] 
Frame * Riskier Option Better * Final Choice vs. Policy .47 -1.53 .13 [.18, 1.23] 
Frame * Outcome Type * Final Choice vs. Policy Choice .71 -0.52 .61 [.19, 2.61] 
Riskier Option Better * Outcome Type * Final Choice vs. Policy Choice .39 -1.63 .10 [.13, 1.20] 
Frame * Riskier Option Better * Outcome Type * Final Choice vs. Policy 2.52 1.18 .24 [.54, 11.79] 
     
Constant .32 -4.34 .00 [.19, .53] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure captions 
Figure 1. The proportion of participants selecting the riskier option over choices involving 
monetary (left panel) and temporal outcomes (right panel) plotted separately by condition: 
Outcomes involving gains and losses where the riskier option was better or worse than the 
safer option. 
 
Figure 2. Scatter plots showing the relationships between the averaged rate of selecting the 
riskier option within, across gains and losses, and between monetary and temporal outcomes. 
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